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Custody Investigation in Divorce

Cases: The New York Law
Revision Commission Proposal in
Perspective
ROBERT J. LEVY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ongoing policy debate between advocates of "nonadversarial" marriage dissolution administration ("mediation" is their
current proposal) and those who continue to support "adversary
methods" has become urgent and intense. The New York Law Revision Commission bill debated in this symposium 1 is a fair illustration of the "nonadversarial" genre. The Commission's bill would
create a public, judicially supervised, social service bureaucracy to
conduct "mediations" and/or custody investigations in divorce
cases if the judge deems the service necessary.2 Such proposals
have been endorsed enthusiastically by judges, who seem concerned primarily to reduce what they perceive as a flood of difficult
and emotional divorce litigation. Such proposals have also been
supported by a diverse but vocal group of advocates: social service
professionals, some of whom are seeking to preserve existing jobs
and to create new ones in times when professional opportunities
are declining; 3 some divorced spouses who, as a result of their
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. Kenyon College, 1952; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1957.
1. Symposium, Children, Divorce and the Legal System: The Direction for Reform, 19
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 105 (1985) [hereinafter Symposium].
2. Both this essay and my oral presentation to the conference on the Law Revision
Commission's proposal are based upon a legal analysis of the role envisioned for custody
investigations by their promoters and an empirical study of one full set of such investigations in one county in Minnesota conducted during 1970. For the complete discussion, see
Levy, Custody Investigations in Divorce Cases, 1985 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 713 [hereinafter
Levy, Custody Investigations].
3. Cf. J. Haynes, Divorce Mediation xii (1981) ("Divorce Mediation breaks new
ground. It opens the possibility of a new field of professional practice. . . ."). See also Stier
& Hamilton, Teaching Divorce Mediation: Creating a Better Fit Between Family Systems
and the Legal System, 48 Alb. L. Rev. 693 (1984) (contending that mediated divorces will
better serve the spouses and their children). Testimony in support of the Legislative Revision Commission's bill by social service professionals and their representatives before the
New York Assembly Judiciary Committee on A. 7315/S. 5127, Dec. 6, 1985, developed a
predictable theme: salaries for social service professionals forecast by the Commission are
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experiences with the law and lawyers, believe that their children
were harmed by legal contention; and a relatively small group of
lawyers and researchers whose careers (in legal practice or in the
academy) have somehow become attached to what they describe as
the "nonadversarial" (or "ADR," for alternative dispute resolution) "movement." The opponents, the defenders of the status quo,
are lawyers. In short, "mediation" has become the subject of a classic public policy controversy: supposedly disinterested advocates of
reform have joined forces with professionals who have an economic
interest in adoption of a new program, to do battle with guardians
of traditional practices - in this case, lawyers who are thought to
be opposed to change because they are afraid the new program will
lower their incomes.4
At least in New York, custody investigations, denominated
"family evaluations," have become the subject of a strategic skirmish in the controversy. The statute proposed by the Law Revision
Commission ties custody investigations to mediation; despite opposition by one or both of the divorcing spouses and perhaps even if
the spouses have already agreed to the child's postdecretal custodian, the trial judge can order mediation "to serve the best interest
of the child"" and can order a custody investigation so long as the
"report may aid in its determination of custody."'7 The statute as
drafted, then, utilizes two "nonadversarial" techniques (mediation
and custody investigations), administered by social service professionals, which sacrifice the autonomy of divorcing spouses in the
too low; professional requirements for the jobs created have to be made more stringent;
existing practitioners must be "grandfathered" (e.g., their professional skills cannot be questioned). Licensing provisions and stringent professional practice standards for anyone not
already a practitioner (the technique might be called monopoly constructing) often accompany creations of new regulatory bureaucracies.
4. For suggestions as to methods for resolving the conflict, see Levy, Comments on the

Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 Fain. L.Q. 525 (1984).
5. See Symposium, supra note 1, at 105, 134 (§ 242(d) of proposed statute). I will use
the term "custody investigation," the more common one in statutes and the academic literature. See generally Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 715-18.
6. Symposium, supra note 1, at 132 (§ 242(b)(4)).
7. Symposium, supra note 1, at 134-35 (§ 242(d)(4)). The Law Revision Commission's
Commentary makes it clear that it intended the judge to have discretion to order an investigation even in cases where the spouses have reached agreement (id. at 150):
The statute takes a middle course between the alternatives of ordering a report in every case and prohibiting a report unless one or both of the parties request it. This position . . . insures that even in an uncontested case, the court can
satisfy itself that the agreement is in the child's best interests.
See also infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
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interests of "child protection." This is reminiscent of the most
dangerous "child saving" tendencies of the juvenile court tradition.8 Thus, both the reformers' intentions and the "nonadversarial" devices they favor invite new and closer attention to custody investigations and to mediation, especially to the role each
can play in facilitating authoritarian impositions by judges into
spousal decisionmaking despite the American norm favoring "family privacy.""
The Law Revision Commission's bill appears to give trial
judges discretion, after an informal conference in chambers, to order spouses to undergo mediation, even if the spouses have already
agreed on the child's postdecretal custodian:
If after the conference . .

.

. the court is of the opinion that

agreement between the parties on custody or a custody plan will
not occur within a reasonable time, the court shall, prior to holding a hearing to resolve the custody dispute, refer the custody dispute for mediation

. . .

unless the court determines that (1) there

is no reasonable possibility that mediation will promote settlement of the issues in the custody dispute or that (2) mediation
will otherwise fail to serve the best interests of the child. At such
time the court shall also consider referral for a family evaluation
report . .

..

The statutory language is either badly drafted or deliberately ambiguous. "Custody dispute" is defined to mean "any action or
8. For a contemporary description of the forces which led to creation of the juvenile
court, see A. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (1969). For a complete
statement of the procedural and substantive evils which the juvenile court "child saving"
movement has produced and a plea for radical reform, see Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative
Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 Minn.
L. Rev. 167 (1981). See also infra note 19 and accompanying text.
For thoughtful and accurate accounts of the juvenile court "movement" and the forces
which produced and perpetuated it, see D. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The
Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America (1980); S. Schlossman, Love and the
American Delinquent (1977). For a fascinating account of "nonadversarial" techniques in
the history of American divorce administration, and the contention that such techniques
were usually adopted in order to eliminate or at least to minimize divorce, see L. Halem,
Divorce Reform: Changing Legal and Social Perspectives (1980). Consider also L. Trilling,
The Liberal Imagination 214 (2d ed. 1953): "Some paradox of our nature leads us, when
once we have made our fellow men the object of our enlightened interest, to go on to make
them the objects of our pity, then our wisdom, ultimately our coercion."
9. See generally Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 782; Mnookin, ChildCustody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Summer 1975, at 226, 265.
10. Symposium, supra note 1, at 132 (§ 242(b)(4)).
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proceeding between parents concerning custody . . ."I' That this
language may have been intended to be broad enough to allow the
judge to order mediation despite opposition by the parents and despite their prior agreement as to a postdecretal custodian is indicated by the reference in the provision quoted above, phrased in
presumptive terms, which directs the judge to order mediation "to
serve the best interests of the child.""2 In short, if the statute's
scope were limited to cases in which the parents are actually contesting custody (rather than including all cases "concerning custody"), the second ("best interests") "jurisdictional" provision
would not have been included. It is true that this interpretation of
the subsection may be inconsistent with its opening language,
which indicates that the judge shall order mediation if "the court
is of the opinion that agreement between the parties on custody or
a custody plan will not occur within a reasonable time ... ."3 It
is also true that a trial judge who is committed to the noninterventionist norm might well interpret the ambiguous language to limit
judicial discretion to order mediation. Since the same subsection
refers to the judge's authority to order an investigation (although
the "jurisdictional" standard is not the same),14 reference to the
Law Revision Commission's intentions as to mediation may be inferred from its intentions concerning investigations - and here
the intent to give the judge discretionary authority even in the absence of real contest is clear. A "family evaluation report," the
statute provides, can be ordered "upon motion by any party or the
court's own motion," even if the spouses have agreed as to which of
them shall become the child's postdecretal custodian, so long as
the report "may aid in [the court's] determination of custody."' 5
The Commission's comments, worth quoting at length, make it
clear that the custody investigation provisions were designed to
function in tandem ("synergistically"' 6 ) with the mediation provisions and to serve interdependent purposes: to "settle" divorce
cases without litigation (the "mediation" function) and to help insure that children are placed with the custodian who will better
serve their interests (the "child protection" function). The
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 130 (§ 242(a)(4)).
at 132 (§ 242(b)(4)).
at 130 (§ 242(a)(4)).
at 134-35 (§ 242(d)(4)).
at 151 (Commission Commentary).
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Commission stated:
Not only does the family evaluation enlist the aid of persons
with specialized training and experience in assessing the best interests of the child, but the evaluation process has also been an
important tool in bringing about settlement of custody disputes.
Lawyers in custody cases may sometimes be hampered in urging a
settlement of a custody dispute, given the strong emotional feelings generated around the issue of custody. Counsel may be perceived by a client as not appropriately supportive of the client's
position in the course of advising a client on settlement. By forcing a client to confront the possibility of a negative report after a
family evaluation, counsel may be able to be more effective in
bringing about some type of settlement without jeopardizing the
attorney-client relationship.
The family history-type evaluation is contemplated in all
cases where the report would materially aid the custody
determination ...
• ..[E]ven in an uncontested case, the court can satisfy itself that the agreement is in the child's best interests.
At the mandatory conference . . . the judge may direct that
the parties proceed for an evaluation rather than for mediation.
Alternatively, if the judge orders mediation, he can advise the
parties that should mediation efforts fail to bring about an agreement, the parties will subsequently be subject to the evaluation
process ...
The concept of mediation followed by evaluation should have
a synergistic effect on both processes. The prospect for parties
undergoing an evaluation which will produce a recommendation
to the court should be a catalyst for serious and good faith efforts
on their parts to reach agreement in mediation. Moreover, the
evaluation process will usually be invoked only when the parties
have not been able to arrive at their own custodial arrangements
for the child, and thus it is an appropriate time to call upon qualified and expert mental health professionals for their assessment
7
of the situation.'
I will first summarize the evidence that compels the conclusion
that custody investigations, nationally and as contemplated by the
Law Revision Commission, must be identified as one of the "non-

adversary" methods of what I have elsewhere named "Child Savers
Inc. -

Divorce Division."1 8 Then I will review the findings of the

17. Id. at 150-51 (emphasis added).
18. Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 719, devised the title. The legal and
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only effort to study an actual sample of custody investigation reports. Finally, I will recommend modifications to the Law Revision
Commission's proposed statute designed to protect the divorcing
population from the risks posed by custody investigations.
II.

THE HISTORICAL SOURCES

The juvenile court "movement" is now, finally, in trouble, and
its procedural methods and substantive standards are headed toward radical modification.1 9 But when divorce reformers were creating the family court, devising nonadversarial methods for divorce
cases and seeking through governmental intervention in family
decisionmaking to protect children whose parents divorce, the juvenile court was a prominent and admired progressive ideal. Reformers of the substantive and procedural law of divorce adopted
almost verbatim the ideology and rhetoric of the juvenile court
"movement." The juvenile court "child savers" favored "individualized justice," with emphasis on the child and the child's rights
rather than those of the parents; they favored specialized courts
and judges and gave great credence to informal and nonadversarial
procedures and clinical assessment and treatment by mental
health experts. The divorce reformers favored the same policies
and advocated the same techniques for divorce litigation.2 0 By
adapting the juvenile court's probation technique (while preserving
its emphasis on psychodynamic interpretations) the divorce reformers created the custody investigation.2 1
The custody investigation's intellectual ancestry in the juvenile court "movement" is not difficult to document. A few examples will have to suffice. As to the proposition that the divorce
court's responsibility to the child is broader than the narrow confines of "adversarial" testimony as offered by the spouses and their
attorneys, consider the comments of a prominent and successful
pleader for creation of a family court structure for New York City:
empirical material which follows is summarized from the much fuller treatment in the same
article - with the permission of the American Bar Foundation.
19. The reasons are adumbrated in Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 719.
See generally Feld, supra note 8.
20. See generally D. Rothman, supra note 8.
21. A complete statement of the "nonadversarial" divorce reform position as articulated by one of its earliest, most formidable and tireless promoters can be found in Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the Trenches, 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 98
(1953).
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Custody litigation may result in a charge by one spouse that the
other is emotionally disturbed or mentally ill, not to the point
where the interests of society as a whole necessitate commitment,
but sufficiently so as to make extensive, or perhaps any, contact
with the child harmful to its well being. . . It is doubtful that
any judge would take it upon himself to make such a determination, without assistance. . . What is called for is, clearly, the services of a person fully trained in the diagnosis of mental and emotional sickness. The parties may or may not see fit to secure the
testimony of expert witnesses on this point. Their failure to do so,
however acceptable in ordinary adversary litigation, can hardly
justify dispensing with that kind of help when the court's jurisdiction is being exercised with reference to the welfare of the
child. Surely there is no adequate reason why the Court should
be
22
dependent for expert help upon the whim of the parties.
As to the need to avoid "adversarial" methods and to rely upon the
special insights of mental health experts such as psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, consider once again the New York
family court proposal:
What is involved essentially is a determination of personality and
emotional attitudes as they affect relationships between the parents and children. Present procedures are inadequate for dealing
with that type of problem for three principal reasons. The first is
that the adversary method is a painfully slow way of developing
the mass of factual detail out of which such attitudes can be
made apparent, and it may often fail to produce significant data.
Second, the conduct of adversary judicial proceedings intensifies
the hostilities and further obscures the picture, whereas there
should be the maximum effort to quiet hostilities and broaden the
area of agreement. Third, the court needs the advice of experts in
the field of human emotions to assist him in making a determination that in law and in fact must deal with emotional problems.
Social investigation into family situations is by now a well
established technique. It is used in connection with probation and
parole as applied to adult offenders. It is used in connection with
the investigation and determination of treatment in [New York's
22. W. Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City, A Report by
a Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 315-16 (1954).
Professor Gellhorn's work attracts special attention in placing custody investigations in
their proper historical perspective because his statement articulated clearly the policies and
their origins as well as their risks. Additional citations and a fuller treatment of the parallels
may be found in Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 718.
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. The common element of these

activities is their use of the basic premises of psychology and psychiatry as the core of what may be called a science of the dynamics of personality and of interpersonal relation. It may be acknowledged that this new science is not fully developed. . . . But
• ..something of general acceptance has been attained which can

be utilized to facilitate the understanding of problems of human
personality and its adjustment. This kind of knowledge is, at least
in theory, a central part of the professional training of probation
officers as well as social workers ...
The matters at issue are factual, but they are not easy to determine. A judge who is a wise man can certainly formulate a conclusion about many of them from observation of parties in the
light of the full factual report. But there is serious doubt whether
observation can be fair and effective where, without further aids,
it consists solely of impressions in the unnatural atmosphere of a
courtroom during the course of contentious proceedings in the
outcome of which the parties have an almost violent interest ...
[T~he simple fact is that lawyers and judges, with rare exceptions,
do not have a fully developed awareness of the possible significant
facts. They should, at the very least, have the benefit of investigations by persons who, because they do have the requisite knowledge, will be able to appreciate and search out those facts.23
The commitment of the "nonadversarial" divorce reformers to
mental health expertise continues almost unabated. Consider the
claim of three psychologists, one of whom is also a lawyer, that
psychological diagnosis and advice is vital in custody cases:
Given the difficulty of resolving many custody disputes with
some assurance that the right decision has been made, it is not
surprising that judges often look to "expert" witnesses for guidance - or for confirmation of, and support for - the court's own

judgments..
We . . . readily agree that many psychological/psychiatric

judgments, such as psychiatric diagnoses, are highly unreliable,
may befuddle rather than clarify the issues to be determined in
courtroom settings, and may even mislead the court. But it is also
our position that psychological testimony, properly circumscribed
and evaluated, may often play a useful, valid role in custody cases

23.

W. Gellhorn, supra note 22, at 310-11, 314.
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* * *[T]hrough interviews or psychological tests, mental
health professionals might be able to discover, and then bring to
the court's attention, feelings, attitudes, and personality traits in
the child(ren) and in the contestants, as well as patterns of interaction between the child(ren) at issue and the contestants that
are relevant to the custodial decision and not otherwise readily
apparent to the court.
. . . [PIsychological interviews and tests may unearth evidence of a severe, but well-concealed psychological disturbance in
a contesting adult. For example, a sensitive interviewer might discover that a female custody contestant harbors the belief that all
men (but not women) are controlled by the devil, though she
knows well enough what other people think of such a belief to
keep it hidden ordinarily. (The malignant power of such a belief,
once it is ascertained, will often be observable in the way the woman relates to men.) It should not require empirical studies to
conclude that a female child who grows up with a female parent
who harbors such deep hostility to men, and who, therefore, cannot provide the child with a positive model for how to relate to
men, will likely (though not necessarily) grow up with attitudes
toward men, and anxieties regarding men, that will seriously interfere with her enjoyment of life and her ability to function in
24
the world in a secure, non-anxious fashion.
These psychologists express nicely the attitudes which have
motivated "nonadversarial" divorce litigation reform proposals and
now underlie the Law Revision Commission's proposed statute.
The argument is that mental health experts are essential and can
be relied upon to detect and report to decisionmakers the subtle
aspects of parental psychodynamics and familial relationships
which will affect how the children of that divorce turn out. "Implicitly, the contention is that because bad outcomes 'will likely
(though not necessarily),' occur, the untrained should defer to the
judgment of those who are able to make the essential differential
predictions."2 5 The reformers' reliance on mental health expertise
is unswerving: they are apparently unaware that adequately
credentialed public agency personnel may nonetheless be badly
trained or simply unqualified, or that mental health jargon can be
and has been used to disguise the imposition of the mental health
24. Litwack, Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. Fam. L. 269, 271, 273, 283, 295-96 (1980) (footnote omitted).
25. Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 724.
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expert's personal values on the expert's clientele.26
Finally, the "nonadversarial" divorce reformers as well as the
promoters of the Law Revision Commission proposal exhibit that
enthusiasm for the reform proposal which characterized the juvenile court "movement" and the later efforts to give social service
professionals a large role in custody decisionmaking. Consider the
advice given to young lawyers by one of the advocates of custody
investigations (himself a lawyer):
[Wihen you are not limited in your freedom of action and you do
have an opportunity to exercise your own judgment, your failure
to accept the proposal from your adversary or from the Court, to
call in the [social service agency which conducted custody investigations in New York City] - or, better yet, to initiate such a step
yourself - puts in serious question your protestations of solici27
tude, however eloquent, for the child's well-being.
Thus, mediation advocates propose compulsory mediation "to
overcome the substantial attrition rate that most voluntary programs experience. 2 8 Research on mediation outcomes, although
widely publicized, is often shallow and hopelessly biased to favor
the value of the "nonadversarial" technique.2" And reform
26. For evidence that these risks have sometimes been realized in custody investigation practice, see Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 763. Litwack, Gerber &
Fenster, supra note 24, at 296, argued that psychological witnesses can be trained to "describe the data and specify the logic upon which they based their conclusions regarding an
individual's personality and level of functioning." So long as trial judges refuse to accept
psychological conclusions bereft of "clear evidence and logic," the authors contended, "there
is little danger that the value judgments of behavioral scientists, masquerading as scientific
opinion, will unfairly sway the judgment of the court." Id. at 297 (footnote omitted). For a
demonstration from actual investigation reports that such a hope is unrealistic, see Levy,
Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 767. Perhaps more important, such simplistic assertions ignore the fact that most investigation reports have an impact on spouses' consensual
decisionmaking rather than in trials before judges. Id. at 735.
27. Rothenberg, The Lawyer's Role in Child Custody Disputes, 23 B. Bull. 95, 98-99
(1966). For a description of the public relations efforts which supported the juvenile court
"movement," see Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 718-28.
28. This is the explanation for the move to compulsory mediation in California given
by Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 Fain. L.Q. 497, 514 (1984).
29. Compare id. with Levy, Comments on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 Faro. L.Q. 525 (1984). At the symposium reported in the present issue, one researcher commented informally that mediation research funding is much easier to obtain if
funders are persuaded that the research product is likely to be favorable to mediation and that researchers lacking the protections of tenure at an academic institution respond in
an appropriate fashion.
For an example of research intended to reinforce the notion that "mediation" is a new
social service distinct from "traditional" custody investigations, see Olson et al., Custody
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advocates show an almost child-like faith in the efficacy of their
program and the good faith and good intentions of the professional
personnel it will attract. 30
There is no doubt that the custody investigations can be identified as one of the "nonadversarial" methods of "Child Savers Inc.
Divorce Division." It remains to determine whether the risks to
children and to family autonomy posed by the interventionist possibilities of custody investigations and the interventionist powers
of custody investigators are real, whether custody investigations
nonetheless serve a useful function, and whether, and how, their
risks can be adequately controlled without abolishing the
institution.
III.

CUSTODY INVESTIGATIONS

My estimate of the advantages and disadvantages of custody
investigations is based upon a review of all the files and reports of
the Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota, Department of
Court Services (the social service agency of that county's divorce
court) for the eighty-four cases in which custody investigations
were ordered by a judge or referee during the initial divorce
Resolution Counseling (CRC): Description and Comparison with Custody Study (CS), in
Child Custody: Literature Review and Alternatives (mimeo. 1979). The research is described
and criticized in Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 778 n.193. See also Cauble,
Thoennes, Pearson & Appleford, A Case Study: Custody Resolution Counseling in Hennepin
County, Minnesota 3, in Pearson & Thoennes, Final Report of the Divorce Mediation Research Project (mimeo. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, Ground Rules for Custody Mediation and
Modification, 48 Alb. L. Rev. 616, 656-57 (1984) (mediation retainer agreement drafted to
provide that in case of postdecretal problems which the spouses cannot resolve themselves,
they must return to mediator who would act as a "gatekeeper" to subsequent arbitration or
postdecretal litigation; mediator could thus deter bad faith efforts by a parent to terminate
mediation; no parallel controls needed to constrain mediator because "[a] mediator presumably would not continue her efforts if both parents thought the process had no chance of
success.
...
).
The Law Revision Commission's proposal would allow the spouses to see the investigator's underlying file only upon "a showing of good cause," Symposium, supra note 1, at 136
(§ 242(f)(3)). "This approach avoids pro forma requests for the underlying work product,
which may be intrusive and obstructive to the evaluation process." Id. at 153 (Commission
Commentary). For evidence that investigators occasionally deliberately suppress from their
reports facts which might have an impact on the parents' or the judge's decisionmaking, see
Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 742, 749, 763. For the claim that investigations cannot adequately be controlled unless investigators are required to keep a running
record of their investigation which will be automatically available to the spouses or their
lawyers, see id. at 795.
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hearing in that county during the year 1970.11 Although more custody investigations were conducted in subsequent years, there is
little reason to believe that the reports filed that year, or the cases
in which reports were filed, are not sufficiently representative to
permit generalizations about custody investigation practice in
other states fifteen years later, or to make predictions about what
may happen in New York under the Law Revision Commission's
proposed statute. For example, of the ten investigators who filed
reports during the year 1970, five are still employed by the Department - some of them conducting mediations under the Department's allegedly "new" "Custody Resolution Counseling" program;"2 and the Commission's model for investigations seems to
have psychological emphases3 3 similar to those in the Hennepin
County reports and, according to impressionistic reports by judges,
to investigation reports in other jurisdictions.34
We should begin with the good news. As the Law Revision
Commission's comments suggest,3 5 custody investigations in Hennepin County during 1970 did in fact produce some (and perhaps
many) settlements. In only three cases did the reports themselves
indicate successful investigator efforts to resolve the dispute. But
in almost three quarters of the cases in which an investigation was
completed, in many of the reports of which there were references
to "counseling" of some kind by the investigators, the spouses
31. For details of the information assembled for Hennepin and two other counties, a
variety of statistical and impressionistic factual data about the reports themselves, the investigators, and some limited information about the clientele's reaction to the reports, see
Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 736-38. Space limitations preclude repetition
of all the evidence assembled in the American Bar Foundation Research Journal to support
the conclusions reported here. Readers should consult the prior article.
32. See supra note 24.
33. See Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 734.
34. See id. at 768 n.177 for a comparison of the psychologically-oriented Hennepin
County reports with those of another Minnesota county in the same year. Id. at 734-35
compares the Hennepin County reports with what the Law Revision Commission's commentary suggests was its vision of a psychologically-oriented report. See also Ash & Guyer, In
the Shadow of Solomon's Sword: The Functions of Psychiatric Evaluation in Contested Custody and Visitation Cases, - J. Am. Acad. Child Psych. (n.d.) (not yet published) (custody investigations by independent mental health experts in Michigan; emphasis on psychological factors and settlement of disputes); Pearson & Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in
Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. Fam. L. 703, 723 (1983) (Colorado trial judges interviewed
for study of social service and judicial practices in contested custody cases where close to
half the sample of cases included a custody investigation "were especially critical of the
private, psychological reports that were extremely jargon-ridden and evaluative.").
35. See Symposium, supra note 1, at 126.
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settled their dispute without further hearing. 36 A report on custody
investigations by therapists at a teaching hospital in Michigan during a recent four-year period also indicates that high settlement
rates in such cases probably result when investigators take "a more
active role in promoting agreement. ' 37 Consider the entire report
filed in one of the 1970 cases:
[In February] a custody study was ordered at an initial divorce
hearing for the four children of the above couple. Both husband
and wife were interviewed individually in the office, both parents
were seen with the children in the family, and a joint conference
was held with both parties present. Mr. H-17, during his individual sessions, stated that he had no particular complaints about
his wife's ability to parent his children and that indeed he felt
that she had been a good mother for the children. Since Mr. H-17
had carried out many of the mothering responsibilities while his
wife worked in the evenings, he had, in fact, taken much of the
mother's role from Mrs. H-17. Mrs. H-17 has shifted her work
hours from evenings to days in the last nine months and has been
at home. in the evenings to care for the children as he had done
previously. Mr. H-17 stated that he was concerned that his wife
may remarry a man she has known who is in the service and that
such a marriage would eventually reduce his association with his
children and the relationship he has with them. This seemed to
be his primary concern and is somewhat unrealistic as the wife
has no commitments at this point with this man and probably
would not marry for two years if at all at that time. Consequently,
I recommended to both parties that they consider a stipulation
which would permit the children to remain with Mrs. H-17, which
both accepted. Contacts with [their attorneys] have indicated
that this has been agreed upon as has [sic] contacts with both
parties."8
The H-17 case was settled because the investigator, a neutral and
objective observer, was able to reassure Mr. H-17 that his wife was
not likely to remarry and move away soon after the divorce. But
cases can be, and have been, settled by investigator coercion as
well as reassurance. In the Minnesota sample there was some evidence of the application of pressure by investigators;3 9 and others
36. See Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 780.
37. Ash & Guyer, supra note 34.
38. H-17 (C/W 1), quoted in Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 779. For an
explanation of the numbering system used to make the cases anonymous, see id. at 714 n.3.
39. See H-81 (CW/4), quoted in Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 788.
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have reported similar incidents in other jurisdictions." Finally, the
Minnesota sample included a particularly unpleasant example of
behind-the-scenes, postdecretal retaliation against a custodial
mother by an investigator whose mediation had been only temporarily "successful" in resolving parental disagreements. 1 Whether
the case settlement potential provided by investigators justifies the
risks they pose of coercion and manipulation of divorcing parents
is hardly an easy decision. But the advocates of the New York Law
Revision Commission program have given no indication that they
even recognize that a trade-off is required.
The statute proposed for New York indicates that the Law
Revision Commission places great faith in the work product of custody investigators. Since investigations can be ordered even where
the parties have already agreed on a custodian, the Commission
obviously believes that reports will be neutral and impartial and
will help judges to "satisfy [themselves] that the agreement is in
the child's best interests. ' 42 Since a "good cause" showing is required to permit the parties to have access to the investigator's
underlying file, 3 the Commission must believe that investigators'
factfinding and reporting will be reliable. Unfortunately, the evidence from the Hennepin County reports suggests that these assumptions are unwarranted. Some of the reports were modest,
thoughtful and, insofar as it was possible to check their facts, careful and accurate. But such conclusions could not be drawn about
all, or even most, of the reports. In virtually none of the cases was
it possible for a neutral decisionmaker to determine independently
40.

See Ash & Guyer, supra note 34:
The evaluator made clear that if the parents could not settle their dispute, a
full evaluation would follow. This alone made intrafamily settlements more attractive . ...
For these parents, the evaluator appeared to be a powerful, but benign figure
with whom they could agree, thus obviating the difficulty they would have had in
"giving in" to a spouse at whom they were furious . ...
• . . [Olur experience illustrates that psychiatric evaluations play a variety of
functions in the process of dispute resolution over and above providing evidence
to a judge. An evaluator who functions as an appointee of the court exerts considerable influence which derives in large part from the shadow of judicial power
which looms behind him . ...
Id. See also Beecher, Custody and Counselling Under the Australian Family Law Act 1975
- Some Sociological Observations, 18 Aust. J. Soc. Issues 98, 100 (1983) (much conciliation
consists of frightening clients as to the "horrors" of court hearings).
41. See H-26 (CW/1), quoted in Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 778.
42. Symposium, supra note 1, at 150 (Commission Commentary).
43. Id. at 136 (§ 242(f)(3)).
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whether the investigator's custody recommendation followed logically and necessarily from the facts reported." In some of the
cases, for example, "by the time information-gathering was complete, the [investigator] had already decided which parent would
make the better custodian - and the report became a 'brief,' defending a decision made in some other ('clinical') fashion. 4 5 In
these cases, the report's description of relevant facts was unreliable; indeed, there were a number of cases in which relevant facts
known to the caseworker were simply suppressed from the report.46
In some cases, investigators "shaped" their reports to produce a
report favorable to a judge or referee who had already made up his
47
mind.
In addition to the fact-finding risks, in some of the cases the
investigators obviously imposed upon the divorcing spouses their
own personal and idiosyncratic child care and behavioral values in
making custodial recommendations rather than relying upon
"mainstream child development values" as to which there is relatively widespread, if not universal, agreement in the academic and
professional literature." One of the investigators utilized the
44. See Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 741-44 nn.100-05 and accompanying text.
45. Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 740.
46. Further evidence that the report was not itself a serious effort to weigh fairly competing custodial claims was provided by the caseworker's failure to report relevant information in his possession. The report did indicate that the mother had been hospitalized by a
psychiatrist thirteen months previously - with a throwaway line about the problem: "Dr.
-provided
counseling, largely around problems centering in the marriage relationship.
A request for an evaluation of Mrs. H-7 has been requested of Dr.
-, but has not been
received as of this writing." The report did not indicate that the hospitalization had been
for "weight loss and depression," that the psychiatrist had reported that the mother had
indicated that she had great "conflicts about taking care of her [child] and was 'running
around,'" that the psychiatrist's diagnosis had been "reactive depression superimposed on a
sociopathic personality." Obviously, the child's presence in her greatgrandmother's home
most of each week could be viewed very differently against a background which included
this information. Significantly, the psychiatrist's letter made it clear that [his views were not
solicited until after it was too late to include them in the investigator's report].
Id. at 742.
47. See Levy, Custody Investigations, supra note 2, at 748.
48. Id. at 749-51. Some reports "hinted at an even more disquieting use of differential
standards for minority race families and racially mixed couples." Id. at 752 n.137. In H-9
(CW/5), for example, the report
commented that the wife, a young woman who had emigrated from Germany after
her marriage to a soldier from Minnesota, was living with an "age 27, young, a
divorced negro man. This was verified during an unannounced home visit." (This
was one of the very few unannounced home visits described in the entire sample
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"maternal presumption" consistently, but in most cases,
the presumption appeared to be a tool, a contention to be hauled
out when it might add persuasiveness to a recommendation of the
mother as custodian. As a result, those reports which rely heavily
upon the presumption appear to lawyer-readers, accustomed to
assessing whether conclusions follow from factual premises, to be
unpersuasive and unsatisfactory."9
The investigators were much more consistent when addressing issues of extramarital sexual practices by custodial mothers. In cases
presenting this behavior, there was close to an automatic
disqualification:
Since Mrs. H-24 has not yet clarified her thinking as to her relationship with Mr.

__

vs. the care and welfare of the children, I

am not convinced custody should automatically be awarded to the
mother at this time, due to their young ages. It is therefore recommended custody of [one child] and [the other child] remain
with the father with liberal visitation rights by the mother. Contact of the children with Mr.

-

is considered not to be in the

children's best interest.50
The investigators' application of a "disqualification for sexual misconduct" has unhappy implications, both for the hope for reliable
factfinding and for minimizing the discretion of investigators:
It is difficult to analyze fairly or to criticize recommendations
based upon values which were quite common prior to the "sexual
revolution" but appear very dated by contemporary norms. If the
[investigators'] reports and recommendation simply reflected
widespread community as well as their own moral and parenting
values, it might be culturally and morally arrogant to find even
mental health professionals at fault for being "normal" members
of reports.) The caseworker emphasized the wife's "independent and defiant nature" and "rebellious attitude" when threatened that she would lose custody of
her son "when she became involved in racially mixed relationships," and reported
that the wife "stubbornly stayed with her decision to seek divorce and make
friends of her own choosing." The caseworker also made a full report about allegations of physical abuse of the child by the "stepfather," including directions as to
how to obtain a police report and pictures, despite the fact that an investigation of
the allegations by the police had concluded (and the caseworker agreed) that
abuse had not occurred.
Id. at 752 n.137.
49. Id. at 758.
50. Id. at 756.

1985]

Custody Investigation and Divorce

of their community. But the sexual revolution had certainly begun by 1970; academic and professional criticism of imposing
moral norms in divorce and custody litigation had already
reached a crescendo; and [the Minnesota Supreme Court's] and
other cases indicate that the courts were already beginning to respond to these new norms. The [investigators'] emphasis on
mothers' sexual practices may have been, then, something of a
rear-guard action to preserve disappearing moral standards and
to punish deviants.
A discretionary exclusion for sexual conduct substantially increases the caseworker's real authority - perhaps more in uncontested than in contested cases. Nothing requires the [investigator]
to cite or to emphasize the exclusion uniformly (and, excepting
CW/5, the Hennepin County [investigators] did not). . . Thus,
whether the [investigator] investigates the behavior, decides to
report it, and the extent to which the [investigator] emphasizes
the behavior in the report, may play a decisive role in even a negotiated outcome. The risks of "moral imperialism" are obvious
5
and substantial. '
The litany of realized dangers continues. The Hennepin
County reports regularly emphasized conclusory psychodynamic
interpretations which were not subject to easy or convincing rebuttal, 52 which occasionally reflected only current fashions or fads in
the therapy community," or which sometimes masked in the language of therapy and family dynamics the investigator's personal
and idiosyncratic values.5 In addition, the "psychological style"
seemed from time to time to bias the investigators to favor the
parent who was willing to agree to or seemed more amenable to
counseling.55 This style also relied for individual diagnosis and prediction on statistical profile results of pro forma administrations of
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, a standard nonprojective personality test.5" The results were inevitably misleading. In short, the Hennepin County investigators did not distinguish themselves in their use of psychological and family
relationship material and criteria.5 7
51. Id. at 762-63.
52. Id. at 763-71.
53. Id. at 768-69.
54. Id. at 769.
55. Id. at 770-71.
56. Id. at 775-78.
57. These bare conclusions are supported by substantial evidence from the reports
themselves. Id. at 776. Anyone tempted to doubt these conclusions should consult the full
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The Hennepin County reports also indicate that the Law Revision Commission's implicit expectation that custody investigations can be used for purposes of juvenile-court-like child protection (or "child saving") is correct. Because that expectation is
correct, divorcing parents and their children who are subject to
custody investigations may also be subjected to significant authori58
tarian impositions on their privacy during and after their divorce:
In fact, the problem is a very serious one: custody investigations
create for caseworkers a procedurally and substantively unconstrained opportunity to influence (indeed, control) the behavior of
divorcing spouses simply because they can't agree as to the children's post-divorce custodian (and occasionally even if they have
agreed). Safeguards would be in order even if reading the reports
did not produce anxiety - as does reading the 1970 Hennepin
County set - about the moralistic, judgmental, sometimes punitive, and occasionally manipulative qualities of the caseworkers
and their work product ....

Although the judges did not seem

very interested in postdecretal supervision orders, certainly less
interested than the [investigators] were, a rule prohibiting such
orders in the absence of both spouses' consent can .. .be defended . . . . [N]o one is given authority to arbitrate undivorced

parents' petty quarrels which hurt their kids, so long as juvenile
court minimum standards are not transgressed. Nor is there reason to believe that kids whose parents have divorced need or
should have more protection - and some reason to doubt the
wisdom of relying on such protection in any event (at least if the
Hennepin County files are the appropriate criterion)."
IV. CONCLUSION
No one should doubt that controls are essential. Indeed, there
is a fair argument that in a state like New York, where no social
service bureaucracy has as yet been established, the best policy
would be to avoid "nonadversarial" aids of the custody investigation variety. But if the case settlement potential of investigations
is considered essential (a judgment, it should be emphasized, I refused to make earlier), it is simply irresponsible not to include in
the statute techniques designed to preclude the demonstrated evils
of the Hennepin County program. Such techniques can be devised.
description of the evidence.
58. Id. at 782-87.
59. Id. at 789-90.
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The evils include coercive settlement effects, faulty factfinding, imposition of improper substantive custody criteria and coercive
child protection efforts by investigators. If custody investigations
are to be allowed at all, then, at a minimum the legislature should
deny judges discretion to order an investigation unless both
spouses agree to it; because most investigations are used by the
spouses rather than by the judge in litigation, the investigator
should be required to keep "running dictation" 60 of all contacts
and that record should be automatically available to the spouses
and their attorneys so that they will be able to estimate the reliability of the investigator's report and its likely impact on the judge
if the case is litigated.
The injuries which professionals who combine zeal and authoritarian power can perpetrate on children and their parents have
been documented regularly.6 1 No extensive "nonadversarial" program for divorce administration which ignores that documentation
should be enacted and I believe, therefore, that the Law Revision
Commission's proposal should be amended or abandoned.

60. See id. at 741 n.100 & 795 n.240 for a description of this practice among many
mental health professionals.
61. See F. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 33-34 (1964).

